South Asian Pulse

The Houthis and the TTP: Is the Game the Same? - by: Engineer Iftikhar Chaudhry

When my Yemeni friend, Saddam Al-Harbi, told me, “Yemen’s interests and the legitimacy of the Yemeni government come first. Saudi Arabia is our ally as Yemenis, while Iran is our enemy because it is killing us through the Houthi group,” I listened to him carefully.

His words were not merely the complaint of a Yemeni citizen. They carried the pain of a country that has been paying the price of war, foreign intervention and internal division for years.

But Saddam’s words raised another question in my mind:

Is the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) playing the same kind of game in Pakistan that the Houthis are playing in Yemen?

The two groups are not identical in their history, sectarian background, political objectives or geography. To describe them as exactly the same would be an oversimplification. But there is one aspect that deserves serious consideration: both use armed force to challenge the state, both have caused enormous suffering to civilians and state institutions, and the role of external powers and regional support has repeatedly been a subject of concern and debate.

In the case of the Houthis, the question of Iranian support is no longer merely a passing political accusation. Various international reports and analyses have discussed Iranian military and technical assistance to the Houthis, including weapons, training and intelligence support.

Now let us turn to Pakistan.

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, is an armed terrorist organization that has carried out attacks against Pakistan. Soldiers, police officers, civilians, scholars, children and ordinary citizens have all paid the price.

Pakistan has repeatedly maintained that TTP elements operate from Afghan territory and that safe havens and facilitation are available to them there.

This raises a legitimate question:

If Yemenis have the right to ask, “Who is giving the Houthis power on our soil?”, why should the Pakistani people not have the right to ask, “Where is the TTP getting its safe havens and facilitation?”

And another question follows—not as an accusation, but as a matter of national security and investigation:

Is Afghanistan the only factor behind the continuing terrorism against Pakistan, or could another regional power also be involved in supporting it as part of a hidden strategy?

India's name frequently appears in Pakistani discussions about terrorism. Pakistan has, in the past, accused India of supporting terrorism and destabilizing activities. But any serious writer must distinguish between an allegation and an established fact.

Therefore, I would not claim that India is necessarily directing the TTP in the same way that Iran supports the Houthis. Such a claim would require strong and verifiable evidence.

But is there anything wrong with asking the question?

No.

Proxy wars are not new in international politics. Major and regional powers sometimes avoid direct confrontation and instead use local groups to pursue their interests and expand their influence.

Yemen is one prominent example of this kind of regional struggle.

Pakistan, too, must ask serious questions.

If Afghan territory is being used against Pakistan, Islamabad must address the matter clearly and firmly with the Afghan authorities. If a third power is fueling the fire, evidence should be collected and presented before the international community. If any Indian network is proven to be involved, the evidence should be placed before the world.

But if there is insufficient evidence, no country should be accused merely on the basis of political emotion.

Because the information war has become an important part of modern warfare.

Yemen offers another lesson. When external powers enter the internal conflicts of a country, the issue no longer remains simply a struggle between a government and an armed group. Ports, maritime routes, oil, trade, regional influence and international interests all become part of the conflict.

Pakistan faces a similar danger.

If we see the TTP merely as a group of terrorists, we may fail to understand the larger picture. We need to ask: Where does the money come from? Where do the weapons come from? Where is the training taking place? Who are the facilitators? Who provides intelligence? And what political and regional interests lie behind the violence?

Then comes the most important question:

Are we perhaps becoming a battlefield for someone else’s proxy war?

Saddam Al-Harbi’s words made me ask these questions because Yemen and Pakistan are both Muslim countries that have paid a heavy price for terrorism and political instability. Both are also surrounded by the interests of different regional powers.

And both peoples want something very simple: their countries should not become battlefields for someone else’s war.

Saddam Al-Harbi wants Yemen to come first.

I want Pakistan to come first.

Iran’s war is not Pakistan’s war. Afghanistan’s war is not Pakistan’s war. India’s war is not Pakistan’s war. Pakistan should not become a battlefield for any other power.

Pakistan must make its decisions according to its national interests and protect its territory, its people and its future.

Perhaps today we should begin by asking three simple questions:

Who owns the bullet that is killing a Pakistani citizen?
Who is pulling the trigger?
And what is the real interest of the power supporting that weapon?

The answers must be sought through evidence, not emotion.

Because the war against terrorism is not fought only at the border. It also has fronts in the realm of minds, diplomacy, economics and information.